This prospective, observational, anonymous incident reporting study aimed to identify and correct factors leading to reduced patient safety in intensive care. An incident was any event which caused or had the potential to cause harm to the patient, but included problems in policy or procedure. Reports were discussed at monthly meetings. Of 390 incidents, 106 occasioned "actual" harm and 284 "potential" harm. There was one death, 86 severe complications and 88 complications of minor severity. Most were transient but the effects of 24 lasted up to a week. Most incidents affected cardiovascular and respiratory systems. Incident categories involved drugs, equipment, management or procedures. Incident causes were knowledge-based, rule-based, technical, slip/lapse, no error or unclassifiable. The study has identified some human and equipment performance problems in our intensive care unit. Correction of these should lead to a reduction in the future incidence of those events and hence an increased level of patient safety.
assessment of data sheets and feedback from staff a number of modifications were made. The type of incidents which staff could report was not restricted in any way. We thereby hoped to obtain the broadest possible interpretation of an "event". Data regarding an event was collected via a relatively unstructured data sheet. There was one compulsory section to ensure identification of time, date, experience level of the staff involved and discovery method (routine/non-routine). A "description" section allowed for individual explanation of the event and recommendations for prevention of similar events. These forms were placed at each bedside and on completion were posted in a box in the lCU area. Forms were regularly collected and collated. Combined medical and nursing staff meetings were held on a monthly basis to discuss incidents and plan remedial action where necessary. Data from the patients entered during the pilot phase is included in the final data analysis.
A computer database (Paradox 3.5-(C) Borland International) was designed to facilitate analysis.
DEFINITIONS
Adverse incident: an unplanned event which caused, or had the potential to cause, harm to patients by a preventable, iatrogenic mechanism.
Severe-event occasioning a major degree of physiological change. Death-event occasioning the death of the patient in a direct relationship. Duration:
Transient-event or its direct effect lasting only minutes to an hour or two. Short-term-event or its direct effect lasting two to three hours to a week. Medium-term-event or its direct effect lasting between a week and several months. Permanent-event or its direct effect lasting for the duration of the patient's life. Routine discovery: event detected during scheduled nursing or medical observation or care. Non-routine discovery: event detected outside the framework of scheduled nursing or medical observations.
EVENT ASSOCIATIONS
Procedural: related to staff activity involving direct patient contact for daily care, as well as diagnostic, physical or therapeutic interventions. Drugs/medications: related to preparation and administration of drugs. Management: related to broader unit or hospital administrative practices, protocols and standards. Equipment: related to failure or misuse of electrical or mechanical devices involved in patient care.
RESULTS
There were 2153 admissions between February 1991 and February 1993. Of these, approximately 50070 were cardiac surgical. Our ICU also treats adult general medical and surgical patients as well as acute spinal injuries and liver transplants. Surgical admissions were approximately 80% overall and medical 20%: 45% of admissions were non-elective. There were 3608 bed days in total and 390 incidents reported. The frequency distribution of incident reporting is shown by month ( Figure 1 ). The frequency of reports varied widely particularly in the early part of the survey when staff were getting used to the concept. A mean of 16.4 events were reported each month. The rate of incident reporting did not appear to have a direct relationship to patient admission rate. Of the 390 events, 106 occasioned "actual" harm and 284 "potential" harm. Events causing actual harm were those which caused a significant change from the baseline condition, e.g. fluctuations of blood pressure greater than 20% which were induced by drug or equipment errors. Other examples included hypo-or hyperglycaemia associated with a breach of insulin therapy protocol or administration errors, hypoxaemia associated with inadvertent extubation, accidental removal of central venous or arterial lines requiring a replacement procedure, accidental arterial or pleural puncture during central venous cannulation, etc. However, the duration of the physiological disturbance associated with an event may be transient and without long-term sequelae. No stroke or myocardial ischaemic event was identified as being associated with an incident.
The most serious incident was a death due to atrial perforation and pericardial tamponade by a new type of radiology access catheter. The problem mainly arose from deficiencies in communication between radiologist and ICU staff regarding the need to retain this catheter. Apart from this one death, there were 86 severe and 88 minor incidents ( Figure 2 ). A total of 167 incidents caused physiological alteration of less than three hours' duration and 24 lasted up to a week ( Figure 3 ). There were 31 incidents in unstable intensive care patients, 205 in stable intensive care patients and Severity of reported incidents. The majority of reports were not assessable (NA) for severity because they were associated with "potential harm" only or because there was insufficient information on the report. 27 in high dependency patients. One hundred and sixtytwo incidents were detected during scheduled handovers or checks; 226 were detected by non-scheduled checks, alarms or chance. The majority of incidents were reported during the day and evening nursing shifts ( Figure 4 ); 105 were detected by senior intensive care nursing or medical staff and 95 by ICU trained nursing staff. The majority of incidents affected cardiovascular (91) and respiratory systems (63) ( Table 1) . Incident categories involved drugs (122), equipment (154), management (49) or procedures (65) ( Figure 5 ).
Incidents could be described as knowledge-based (78), rule-based (57), technical (69), slip/lapse (37), no error (56), or unclassifiable (93) ( Figure 6 ). Corrective strategies were primarily implemented by nursing staff (120) or medical staff (62 No. of Reports FIGURE 5: Incidents were divided into four major categories based on the nature of the most immediate factor associated with the detected even t. require direct patient intervention but rather teaching junior staff better practice or managerial level alterations in unit practice ( Figure 7) . A combination of these interventions often occurred but only that most directly related to the actual event was recorded.
DISCUSSION
The collection of data for this study posed several problems. Firstly an anonymous form with a free text narrative section means that reports inevitably omit some desirable information. The study coordinators must then add their own interpretation as to what happened or was the cause, duration or sequelae of the event prior to its incorporation into the data base. The problem was somewhat overcome with refinement of the data form and extra information obtained during the monthly review meetings. Nevertheless, some of the results (the first 131) incorporate the researcher's interpretation of the event as submitted, in addition to the information written by the reporter. Information most often omitted in the early reports pertained to method of detection, incident severity, duration or action taken. Many of the unclassified or nonassessable entries in the database relate to this deficiency. Rate of Reporting: Any voluntary reporting system suffers from a lack of knowledge as to the absolute frequency of events. This is well demonstrated by Figure  1 which shows that the monthly reporting rate was highly variable although the number of patients admitted remained relatively constant. The degree of enthusiasm and encouragement demonstrated by the co-ordinators was a major factor in the early fluctuations, particularly during October and November 1991 (months 6 and 7 of the program) when other commitments were heavy. High rates of reporting compliance Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, Vol. 22, No. 5, October, 1994 are dependent on continual reinforcement of the project to staff. This is a logistic problem when new staff commence, e.g. at the beginning of new nursing courses, resident medical officer rotations and vacation periods such as Christmas/New Year when academic and quality assurance (QA) programs tend to be suspended. There were many episodes of incomplete reporting identified even during high compliance periods. On many occasions staff would defer writing the report until the end of shift or another convenient time. This contributed to an undefined level of inaccuracy, or forgetting to report at all. Staff may not have wished to report incidents about which they felt "threatened". As this was a voluntary and anonymous study they were not forced. However the coordinators are aware of many incidents which were not reported. Therefore the frequency figures in this paper are conservative. Other authors describe similar problems. Rubins and Moskowitz 1 reviewed patient notes to identify adverse events. Although definite inclusion criteria were used the author acknowledged that some events were not documented and that their estimate was "undoubtedly a conservative one". A study by Giraud et aP used a prospective observational design to detect and report adverse events. Although not acknowledged in the study limitations, it is probable that the design would miss events for the very reason suggested above.
The failure to describe the true incidence of these incidents does not necessarily detract from the value of voluntary reporting studies. As discussed by WiIIiamson and Mackay3 and Runciman et ai', reporting studies are inexpensive and constitute a valid sampling mechanism. They must be large and on-going in order to minimize the bias and sampling error. They provide important qualitative information about work practices and human error which would not otherwise be available at all. The absence of an absolute frequency of events does, however, mean that it is difficult to judge the efficacy of remedial programs.
Distribution of Incidents by Time: Most incidents were reported during the period 0800 to 2200 hours. Potential reasons for this include: (1) an increased actual number of events during the busiest time of the day as most procedures, transports, admissions and communications between staff occur during this time of day; (2) an increased reporting rate as there are more staff from many disciplines interacting at this time with an attendant increased level of observation of the patient. Night shift has a significant reduction in general activity compared to daylight hours, but the incidence of events remains relatively high. Events tend to be discovered by non-routine methods after midnight. Reduced activity may allow increased time during the shift for documentation of incidents.
Event Classification: Events may be defined using descriptive and analytic methods. Classification of an event into a single descriptive category is often difficult due to the multitude of contributory factors. Overlap of events between descriptive categories is difficult to avoid if a systematic analysis procedure is not adopted. The four broad categories selected to describe incidents were decided following study of the pilot data. Many incidents could easily be placed into one of two groups, e.g. an inotrope infusion running through and causing hypotension while the nurse was at a meal break. In this case, policies for patient "handover" were not adhered to, however, the incident related to hypotension from the failure of a drug administration. Therefore the event association specified could be either Management or Drugs. Adoption of guidelines for primary and secondary causes of events is necessary to resolve this confusion. We decided to classify events by the component which was most directly related to the final detected physiological change. In the example above the event would have a primary classification as "drugrelated" and a secondary classification as "management" by virtue of a failure to adhere to policy.
Classification crossover was also a problem when analysing the corrective action taken, i.e. the' 'action" category. Often this was not clearly defined in the report and was inferred by the co-ordinators. It is important to recognise that only the first actions taken are listed here. Not surprisingly, nursing therapy accounts for the largest number of actions taken (Figure 7 ). However, in some reports it would appear from the narrative section that several corrective strategies were employed, e.g. senior nurse or medical consultant may initiate the corrective step as regards the patient, give individual instruction to the bedside nurse or resident, and recognise a deficiency in standards of protocol or education and recommend improvements. After the monthly review meeting some events may have initiated protocol change or correspondence; however, these actions are not included on the initial report and must be completed by the coordinator. Strategies implemented at this time were recorded separately.
Human Error: Whereas the reporting and review of "adverse incidents" has been commonplace in fields such as aviation and other disciplines with a high level of concern for safety, medicine has focused mostly on mortality and morbidity examinations. Medicine has generally been lacking a formalized method for adverse event monitoring and review as a means of prevention. Although infrequent, the monitoring of adverse incidents in intensive care is one of the few medical areas outside anaesthesia which has been described 69 • In general these reports do not subject the data to rigorous analysis in the manner of aviation incident reporting systems or anaesthesia systems such as that described by Runciman 1o • Understanding the nature of these incident data often relies upon understanding a complex system at many levels. Human error is inherent in any system and is often the underlying causal factor of an adverse event. Approximately 80070 of preventable incidents are due to human error 3 • Reason ll discusses several gross examples in which human error at many levels was related to the cause of accidents such as the "Challenger" Space Shuttle explosion, and the "Herald of Free Enterprise" ferry capsize. There are predictable, identifiable mechanisms to human error, many of which may be involved as latent factors in the development of a particular incident. Runciman 'o indicates that understanding human error is the first step towards incident management and prevention. Allnut 12 suggests that human error is a necessary part of human cognition, and that to disclaim its occurrence based on years of experience or seniority is a mistake in itself.
Human error was categorized by Norman" into two types: slips and mistakes. Slips, i.e. actions not intended, occur due to a failure of low level cognition processes, where usually large amounts of information are easily processed and minimal numbers of conscious decisions are made. An incident occurs when a momentary distraction happens. Runciman 'o describes this is as error when the intention was correct but the action was wrong. Mistakes, i.e. errors due to poorly formed intentions, are related to an incorrect decision: a failure of high level cognition. This may be due to inadequate factual knowledge, a new circumstance with inadequate experience, inadequate time to formulate an appropriate plan or poor judgement. Allnut expands on the Aircraft Pilot/Anaesthetist analogy as an error-prone area with high technology, working in a large team, and at times under far from ideal conditions. This situation is replicated and often amplified in the Intensive Care environment.
Reason expanded the two-tier classification to three levels and Runciman has taken this one step further. This classification now consists of errors grouped into Knowledge-based (inadequate or incorrect factual information), Rule-based (failure to adhere to accepted protocols or procedures which had been designed to minimize error), Lapse/Slip (knowledge and intent to follow protocols present but attention distracted or vigilance reduced resulting in failure to perform intended action), and Technical (where knowledge, adherence to protocol and intent were all correct but the desired outcome was not achieved). Where we had sufficient information, we were able to place most of our ICU incidents into this system ( Figure 6 ). Complex systems have infinite potential for the occurrence of mistakes. It is worthwhile noting a comment by Senders and Morayl., "if creativity and error (unplanned variation in performance) are opposite sides of the same coin, then eliminating error, if that were possible, might also inhibit creative problem-solving:" i.e. we learn and develop by analysing our mistakes.
It is important therefore, that the reporting of incidents in Intensive Care does not seek to apportion blame but rather seeks causative factors related to the occurrence of human error, i.e. communication strategies, equipment design-particularly interfaces with patients and staff, environmental and management strategies. The process of monitoring, seeking causal factors and implementing preventative strategies recognises that human error is real, but seeks to minimize the frequency and impact of these incidents.
Adverse Incidents-The Feedback Loop: Despite the increasing frequency of publications describing and categorizing adverse incidents in the Intensive Care environmentz,6,7, no accepted preventive or remedial strategies are defined. Zapol9 asks "in what direction should we proceed if we hope to reduce our iatrogenic complication rate?" Giraud et aF make recommendations based on levels of staffing, standards, and equipment. Other bodies such as the airline industryI' publish a professional journal with a specific section relating to the reporting and assessment of "incidents". Establishment of a national incident monitoring registry and information "clearing house" may be a very useful aid. The different case mix, demographics and work practices of individual Intensive Care Units implies that a local review of incidents is necessary. We have found that without constant local reinforcement and feedback to all staff, the reporting program fails. Therefore the optimal system will include elements of both local reporting and feedback in conjunction with a large-scale information database. This would aid identification of Iow-frequency, high-impact incidents and provide a better understanding of variations due to different work-practice environments.
Our "system" includes such a local mechanism whereby medical and nursing staff combine to review events reported over the preceding month. This meeting includes a feedback review of any action taken from the previous month. The anonymous reports are read out verbatim and each discussed. Action taken may include liaison to another department, telephone contact, policy change, protocol establishment, or simple discussion. All staff participate independent of the hierarchical structure, thereby empowering all to contribute. The feedback loop is closed while staff Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, Vol. 22, No. 5, October, 1994 remember the incident and hence the relevance and efficacy of the process are enhanced.
CONCLUSIONS
Implementation of a prospective, confidential, nonpunitive incident reporting system in Intensive Care is practicable and efficacious. Appropriate staff handovers combined with routine equipment, drug and procedure checks will identify approximately 40070 of adverse incidents, often before they cause "actual harm". A prospective reporting system facilitates staff discussion and management decisions aimed at maintenance of high standards of patient care without the need to resort to crisis management. Because of the absence of data regarding absolute incident frequency there will always be uncertainty as to the efficacy of corrective strategies. Nevertheless, we believe adverse incident reporting to be a very worthwhile addition to our Quality Assurance program.
